Misconfigured Jackson
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TLDR: Misconfigured Jackson, introduced in 2009, can lead to vulnerabilities such as remote code execution (RCE), data leakage, and insecure deserialization. These issues often result from improper handling of deserialization settings, inadequate input validation, and unsafe configurations, violating several OWASP Top Ten principles, including Input Validation, Access Controls, and secure Error Handling.
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson
Improper deserialization of untrusted inputs is a significant risk with misconfigured Jackson. By failing to restrict allowed types during deserialization, attackers can inject malicious objects, resulting in RCE or other unauthorized actions. Using the `@JsonTypeInfo` annotation carefully and restricting polymorphic types ensures compliance with OWASP Top Ten's secure deserialization guidelines.
https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Insecure_Deserialization
Exposing sensitive data during serialization or deserialization without encryption can lead to data leakage. Fields such as passwords or API keys embedded in serialized data must be encrypted to adhere to OWASP Top Ten's Data Encryption principles.
https://owasp.org/www-community/Data_Encryption
Failing to configure Jackson to enforce input validation on serialized data increases the risk of malformed payloads being processed. Validating all inputs before deserialization ensures robust security and aligns with OWASP Top Ten's focus on Input Validation.
https://owasp.org/www-community/Input_Validation
Improper handling of exceptions during Jackson deserialization can reveal sensitive information, such as stack traces or debug data, to attackers. Secure Error Handling practices, including masking error outputs in production, are critical to comply with OWASP Top Ten recommendations.
https://owasp.org/www-community/Error_Handling
Over-reliance on Framework Defaults in Jackson can leave applications vulnerable to exploitation. For instance, default deserialization behaviors may expose internal types or allow dangerous operations. Developers must customize Jackson configurations to meet specific security needs, as per OWASP Top Ten best practices.
https://owasp.org/www-community/Framework_Security_Project
Logging raw serialized or deserialized data without sanitization can increase the risk of data leakage. Adopting secure Logging practices, such as encrypting logs and redacting sensitive fields, ensures compliance with OWASP Top Ten's security standards.
https://owasp.org/www-community/Logging_and_Monitoring_Cheat_Sheet
Neglecting to update or check dependencies for Jackson libraries exposes applications to vulnerabilities in older versions. Regular dependency checking and applying alerts for vulnerable components ensures the library is secure and up to date, as per OWASP Top Ten's guidance.
https://owasp.org/www-project-dependency-check/
Jackson's handling of polymorphic types can create security gaps if misused. Disabling default type resolution and specifying exact subtypes using `@JsonSubTypes` minimizes risks, aligning with OWASP Top Ten's recommendations on Sanitization Routines.
https://fasterxml.github.io/jackson-annotations/
Failing to sandbox deserialization environments in Jackson can lead to attacks targeting application resources. Ensuring that deserialization processes are isolated from critical systems reduces RCE risks and adheres to OWASP Top Ten's secure resource management guidelines.
https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Code_Injection
Lastly, improper integration of Jackson with API Endpoints can create unauthorized access points. Validating serialized payloads and enforcing Access Controls ensures secure API communications, as highlighted in OWASP Top Ten best practices.
Serialization Frameworks': Serialization, Apache Avro, Protocol Buffers, Apache Thrift, MessagePack, FlatBuffers, BSON, Kryo, Hessian, Jackson, JSON, YAML, XML, Pickle, SerDe, Avro4s, Protobuf-net, Fastjson, Flexjson, Avro4K, Jackson-Scala; Misconfigured Serialization Frameworks, Misconfigured Apache Avro, Misconfigured Protocol Buffers, Misconfigured Jackson, Misconfigured JSON, Misconfigured YAML, Misconfigured XML, Misconfigured Pickle; Misconfigured Serialization Settings, Misconfigured Data Validation on Deserialization, Misconfigured Logging of Deserialization Errors (navbar_serialization)
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