Misconfigured Neo4j
TLDR: When Neo4j (introduced on February 2007) is misconfigured against the OWASP Top Ten (introduced on July 2003) guidelines, attackers can exploit graph database (introduced on January 1999) queries, compromise sensitive relationships, and manipulate entire data structures. Without proper authentication, authorization, encryption, and parameterized queries (introduced on October 2003), the database becomes vulnerable to unauthorized access, data leaks, and tampering. https://neo4j.com/docs/
A misconfigured authentication layer allows attackers to guess or brute force default credentials. Without enforcing strong password complexity, multi-factor authentication (introduced on February 2011), and regular key rotation, it becomes easier to gain unauthorized access. Proper authentication hardening ensures only legitimate users access Neo4j resources. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Misconfigured authorization policies assign overly broad privileges. A single compromised account can then modify critical nodes or entire subgraphs. Applying role-based access control (introduced on December 2001) and least privilege principles ensures attackers cannot escalate privileges or affect sensitive data. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Without proper input validation and parameterized queries, malicious inputs can become Cypher query language (introduced on November 2011) commands. Attackers inject harmful clauses, retrieve confidential information, or alter the graph structure. Ensuring every query parameter is validated and bound prevents query manipulation attacks. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
A misconfigured TLS (introduced on January 1999) setup allows attackers to intercept traffic between clients and the Neo4j server. Without enabling secure ciphers and disabling outdated protocols, sensitive data travels in plaintext. Enforcing up-to-date TLS configurations protects credentials, queries, and results from eavesdropping. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Neglecting proper logging (introduced on October 1993) and auditing makes it difficult to detect suspicious activities. Without logs capturing failed logins, suspicious query patterns, or privilege changes, intrusions remain hidden. Configuring comprehensive logging and integrating with monitoring solutions identifies anomalies early. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Misconfigured backups stored in unsecured locations or without encryption (introduced on October 2000) are easy prey. Attackers who grab these backups access the entire graph data model and relationships. Encrypting backups, restricting access, and monitoring backup repositories preserves data confidentiality. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Insufficient query resource limits enable performance-based attacks. Attackers issue massive or complex Cypher queries, consuming CPU and memory resources until service degrades. Implementing timeouts, limiting result sets, and controlling memory usage ensures stable performance under duress. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Misconfigured stored procedures or user-defined functions that run with high privileges let attackers inject malicious logic. If parameters are not sanitized or permissions not properly scoped, these procedures become backdoors. Minimizing privileges, validating parameters, and reviewing code regularly prevents exploitation. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Detailed error messages reveal schema structure, indexes, or internal configurations. Attackers leverage this intelligence to refine attacks. Masking error details from users while logging specifics server-side denies attackers insights into the database’s internal design. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Misconfigured maintenance tasks that run scheduled queries or data exports with excessive rights offer another avenue for attackers. If these tasks are not locked down, malicious alterations grant unauthorized capabilities. Restricting maintenance permissions and verifying their sources closes this loophole. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Storing secrets or credentials for external services in Neo4j configuration files without encryption risks immediate compromise if these files are accessed. Attackers who read them gain direct login abilities. Securing secrets in a vault, rotating keys, and never hardcoding credentials prevents easy credential theft. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Lax network access controls exposing the Neo4j port to the public internet enable automated scans and brute force attacks. Without restricting inbound traffic to trusted IPs or using VPN tunnels, attackers probe the database at will. Ensuring strict firewall rules and private networking conceals the database from adversaries. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Failing to patch or update Neo4j promptly leaves known vulnerabilities open. Attackers exploit published weaknesses if database engines remain outdated. Regularly applying security patches, monitoring advisories, and running the latest stable versions prevents exploitation of known flaws. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Weak or absent multi-factor authentication for administrative accounts simplifies unauthorized admin access. Attackers cracking a single password gain full control. Enforcing MFA, complexity policies, and account lockouts after repeated failures hardens the front line against intrusion. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Overly permissive CORS or misconfigured HTTP headers let attackers manipulate client-server communications. If the Neo4j web interface lacks strict headers, hostile websites exploit user sessions. Setting strong headers, limiting origins, and enforcing secure cookies prevents cross-site abuse. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Not enforcing encryption at rest means data files are readable if attackers breach the filesystem. Without disk-level encryption, a stolen hard drive yields all stored data. Enabling full-disk encryption or encryption-at-rest features makes compromised data unintelligible. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Integrations with external IAM or LDAP (introduced on July 1993) systems fail if not aligned with database roles. Attackers exploit these gaps to bypass strong credential checks. Ensuring harmonious integration between identity solutions and Neo4j enforces consistent authentication policies. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Inadequate monitoring of unusual query patterns or data access frequencies means attackers exfiltrate sensitive information undetected. Without anomaly detection, subtle data theft remains invisible. Integrating monitoring tools and alerting on suspicious patterns uncovers stealthy attacks. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Test or development environments holding production-like data but lacking similar protections become attacker playgrounds. Without the same encryption, access controls, or authentication, these clones leak real data. Applying identical security measures and masking sensitive fields ensures no shortcuts for adversaries. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Leaving legacy or deprecated protocols enabled creates known vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit. Outdated authentication methods or protocol versions lack modern safeguards. Disabling legacy features and adopting current security standards removes well-documented attack surfaces. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Integrating APIs that feed directly into Cypher queries without validation exposes the database to injection attacks. Attackers send malicious payloads through the API to manipulate data. Strict schema validation, authentication tokens, and parameterized requests ensure safe API-to-Neo4j interactions. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Undocumented or unnecessary extensions activated by default expand the attack surface. Attackers exploit these rarely used features to gain unauthorized actions. Removing unnecessary extensions, following vendor guidance, and only enabling required modules limit potential vulnerabilities. https://neo4j.com/docs/
Without proper alerting and incident response plans, administrators remain unaware of ongoing intrusions. Attackers quietly map the database, exfiltrate relationships, and vanish. Defining clear escalation paths, testing response procedures, and integrating SIEM tools ensures rapid reaction to detected threats. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
Finally, failing to continuously review and update security configurations keeps the database frozen at initial settings. Over time, threats evolve, and new vulnerabilities emerge. Regular security assessments, configuration audits, and adapting to the latest best practices maintain a resilient Neo4j environment. https://neo4j.com/docs/