TLDR: When a misconfigured Apache Cassandra (introduced on July 2008) environment fails to adhere to the recommendations of the OWASP Top Ten (introduced on July 2003), attackers can exploit weak access controls, unencrypted connections, and improper authentication to gain unauthorized access, manipulate data, or disrupt operations. Properly configuring authentication, encryption, role-based access control (introduced on December 2001), and logging (introduced on October 1993) hardens Apache Cassandra against these threats.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Neglecting proper authentication leaves the Apache Cassandra cluster exposed to anyone who can reach it. Without enforcing complex credentials, multi-factor authentication (introduced on February 2011), or password rotation policies, attackers easily guess or brute force their way in. Strengthening authentication controls keeps uninvited users out.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Misconfigured authorization grants overly broad privileges to certain accounts. If a compromised low-level user can perform administrative tasks, the entire cluster is at risk. Applying least privilege principles and regularly reviewing roles ensures that no single account can cause catastrophic damage.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Failing to use TLS (introduced on January 1999) for client-to-node and node-to-node encryption allows attackers to eavesdrop on unencrypted traffic. Without enforcing secure ciphers and disabling obsolete protocols, sensitive data and credentials travel in cleartext. Enabling and configuring TLS properly protects data from prying eyes.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Without robust logging and auditing, suspicious activities remain concealed. Missing or incomplete logs mean attackers can infiltrate, manipulate data, and exfiltrate information without raising alarms. Configuring comprehensive logging and integrating with monitoring tools detects intrusions early and aids in forensic analysis.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Misconfigured backups stored unencrypted or in accessible locations grant attackers a direct window into the database’s schema and data. If they steal these backups, they own all the sensitive information inside. Encrypting backups, limiting access, and securing storage ensure that even if backups are compromised, data remains safe.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Open firewall rules or default network configurations expose the Apache Cassandra cluster on the public internet. Attackers scanning for accessible clusters launch brute force or injection attempts. Restricting inbound connections to trusted IPs, using private networks, and a properly configured firewall keeps attackers at bay.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Improper input validation at the application layer before sending queries to Apache Cassandra can lead to injection attacks. While Apache Cassandra uses CQL (introduced on March 2012) instead of SQL (introduced on June 1974), malicious input can still produce unexpected behaviors. Validating and sanitizing all inputs ensures that only legitimate queries reach the database.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Lacking resource limits or timeouts allows attackers to run heavy queries, exhaust resources, or cause performance degradations. Without defined limits, attackers can create denial-of-service conditions. Setting strict query timeouts, memory caps, and connection limits maintains availability under duress.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Not enforcing encryption (introduced on October 2000) at rest leaves data files unprotected if attackers gain filesystem access. Without encrypting table files or sensitive fields, stolen disks yield readable data. Applying disk-level or column-level encryption ensures unauthorized users cannot decipher stolen data.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Failing to patch or update Apache Cassandra regularly leaves known vulnerabilities open for attackers. Published exploits target outdated versions easily. Keeping the cluster updated and monitoring security advisories ensures no known exploit remains viable for long.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Weak network segmentation allows attackers who compromise one node to move laterally across the entire cluster. Without proper isolation, a single entry point leads to a full breach. Segmenting networks, employing strict ACLs (introduced on April 1985), and isolating clusters obstruct lateral movement.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Disclosing too much information in error messages reveals internal structures, cluster configurations, or index details. Attackers leverage this intelligence to refine attacks. Configuring error handling to return minimal information to users while logging details internally denies attackers valuable insight.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Enabling unnecessary features or leaving default configurations intact increases the attack surface. Attackers exploit known defaults or rarely used modules. Disabling unnecessary options, following vendor hardening guides, and customizing configurations minimize exploitable components.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

If stored procedures or functions with high privileges exist, attackers feed them malicious inputs to perform unauthorized operations. Without validation and least privilege assignment, these routines become attack points. Reviewing and securing stored functions limits their potential misuse.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Inadequate integration with external IAM (introduced on March 2002) solutions or directory services misaligns authentication and authorization. Attackers exploit these inconsistencies to bypass stringent credentials. Ensuring harmonious alignment between IAM and Cassandra’s access policies keeps identities secure.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Lack of anomaly detection means attacks proceed undetected. Attackers extract unusual volumes of data or execute unexpected queries without triggering alarms. Integrating alerts, anomaly detection, and behavioral analytics ensures swift detection of irregular activities.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Cloning production data into test or development environments without similar security controls creates easy targets. Attackers breach these lower-secure environments to access the same sensitive records. Applying identical security standards and masking sensitive fields in all environments prevents such shortcuts.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Hardcoding credentials or storing keys openly in configuration files hands attackers direct access. If they find these secrets, they bypass authentication easily. Externalizing credentials to secure vaults, rotating them regularly, and never embedding them in code stops such trivial breaches.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Exposing administrative tools or dashboards without authentication grants attackers strategic insights. Armed with performance metrics and configuration details, they refine their tactics. Protecting admin interfaces with strong credentials, encryption, and restricted access denies attackers reconnaissance data.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Leaving outdated protocols active preserves known weaknesses. Attackers rely on these vulnerabilities to outsmart modern defenses. Disabling legacy authentication methods, enforcing the latest encryption standards, and continuously reviewing compatibility settings remove known attack vectors.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Direct integration of APIs (introduced on September 2000) into the Apache Cassandra cluster without strict validation leads to injection attacks. Attackers send malicious payloads through the API, manipulating data directly. Filtering API inputs, enforcing authentication, and validating requests ensures safe database interactions.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Without thorough monitoring of suspicious query patterns, attackers remain stealthy. They can systematically harvest data or modify records without drawing attention. Setting up alerts for anomalous queries and connecting these to SIEM (introduced on December 2005) solutions leads to timely detections.

https://cassandra.apache.org/_/index.html

Neglecting regular security assessments and configuration reviews leaves the cluster stuck with outdated defenses. Over time, threats evolve, and previously secure settings become insufficient. Periodic audits, patching, and adherence to new best practices maintain a resilient Apache Cassandra environment.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

Database | Database management system:

• Object database | Object-oriented
  • Comparison of object database management systems | comparison
• Relational_database | Relational
  • List of relational database management systems | list
  • Comparison of relational database management systems | comparison
• Key-value_database | Key-value
• Column-oriented DBMS | Column-oriented
  • List_of_column-oriented_DBMSes | list
• Document-oriented database | Document-oriented
• Wide_column_store | Wide column store
• Graph database | Graph
• NoSQL
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  • List_of_in-memory_databases | list
• Multi-model_database | Multi-model
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Database Concepts:

• Database
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• Armstrong's axioms
• Codd's_12_rules | Codd's 12 rules
• CAP theorem
• Create, read, update and delete | CRUD
• Null (SQL) | Null
• Candidate key
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• Surrogate key
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Database Objects:

• Relation (database) | Relation
  • Table (database) | table
  • Column (database) | column
  • Row (database) | row
• View (SQL) | View
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• Stored procedure
• Cursor (databases) | Cursor
• Partition (database) | Partition

Database Components:

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• XQuery API for Java | XQJ
• Open Database Connectivity | ODBC
• Query language
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• Query Rewriting | Query rewriting system
• Query plan

Database Functions:

• Database administration | Administration
• Query optimization
• DATABASE | Replication
• Shard_(database_architecture) | Sharding

Related Topics:

• Database models
• Database normalization
• Database storage structures | Database storage
• Distributed database
• Federated database system
• Referential integrity
• Relational algebra
• Relational calculus
• Relational database
• Relational model
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Category:Database_management_systems | Category

Outline of databases

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